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Abstract. We study the revenue maximization problem of a publisher selling
consumer software. We assume that the publisher sells either traditional perpet-
ual licenses, subscription licenses, or both. For our analysis, we employ a game-
theoretic model, which enables us to derive the users’ equilibrium strategies and
the publisher’s optimal pricing strategy. Via extensive numerical evaluations,
we then demonstrate the sizable impact different pricing strategies have on the
publisher’s revenue, and we provide comparative statics for the most impor-
tant settings parameters. Although in practice, many publishers still only sell
perceptual licenses, we find that offering a subscription license in addition to a
perpetual license typically (but not always) leads to significantly higher revenue
than only selling either type of license on its own.
Keywords: Revenue Management · Pricing · Consumer Software· Subscription
· Product Differentiation
1 Introduction
Consumer software, particularly video games, is a multi-billion dollar industry [13,10].
Originally sold on physical media like CDs or DvDs, the rise of fast network connections
has allowed software markets to become increasingly digital, eschewing any physical
medium. This has brought with it a proliferation of new business models, for example
microtransactions (i.e., the sale of many mini-upgrades for small amounts of money),
lootboxes (i.e., randomized microtransactions [2]) or in-game advertisement [1].
In this paper, we analyze the revenue maximization problem of a software publisher
who, while still focused on selling licenses for his product, is open to do this either
in the form of perpetual or subscription licenses. Whereas a classic perpetual license,
once bought, allows a user access to the product for as long as he desires (or, in some
more recent cases, as long as the publisher supports it), a subscription license only
allows access to the product for as long as the user pays a (typically monthly) recurring
fee.1 While in recent years, subscription licenses have have become common for cloud-
based Software-as-a-Service offerings (where their main selling point is access to cloud
hardware), most products that do not come with significant cloud hardware are still only
sold through perpetual licenses (though some publishers have recently experimented
1 Note that this is distinct from subscription services that give access to constantly changing
bundles of products (e.g. Xbox Game Pass).
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with subscription models [6,7]). Since we are interested in the revenue effects of selling
the product itself (as opposed to additional cloud-based features), we exclude any cloud-
based synergy from our analysis.
For a publisher, offering a subscription model has a few obvious advantages com-
pared to perpetual licenses: the barrier of entry gets reduced and natural product
differentiation takes place between users depending on how long they are interested in
the product. This potentially allows the publisher to obtain far higher revenue from
some users than he could with perpetual licenses and may allow him to support the
product for a longer period of time through a continuous revenue stream.
On the other hand, offering a subscription model also comes with certain disadvan-
tages. Users may stop subscribing once a product’s novelty fades, while some users that
would use the product for a long time with low intensity may not be willing to pay a
recurring price at all. In addition, if the option to alternatively buy a perpetual license
is also offered, “market cannibalization” between both offerings may occur. And lastly,
but importantly, while publishers traditionally sell upgrades to keep their product up
to date or expand its features, with a subscription model it is typically assumed that
users always obtain access to the most recent version (not including optional micro-
transactions).
In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach towards analyzing the merit of
offering subscription licenses instead of or in addition to perpetual licenses. Selling a
product over some time horizon is fundamentally a question of revenue management
[5,3] and it is important to take user behavior into account, as users for example may
delay a purchase to wait for a reduction in prices. In contrast to classic revenue man-
agement problems, software as a purely digital good has neither a limited stock nor
marginal costs. Instead, the quality of the product in the eyes of users continuously
decays. Furthermore, offering a subscription option and offering paid but optional up-
grades both constitute forms of product differentiation [9,8,4], though again with very
particular cost and utility structures that differ from the classic literature. In the past,
the revenue effects of subscriptions have been studied for some other domains like an-
cillary services of a repeatedly sold core product (e.g., additional baggage for airline
tickets) [14] or professional Software-as-a-Service offerings (where, importantly, sub-
scriptions provide scalable hardware while buy options do not, and utilities take a very
different form than for consumer software) [11].
To properly analyze the problem and capture all its particularities, we introduce a
tailor-made model that takes the form of a two-step game. In the first step, the publisher
chooses his pricing strategy; in the second step, the users act inside of a discrete time
sub-game where they arrive and dynamically obtain and lose demand for the product.
We prove that there are only five distinct classes of user equilibrium strategies, which
significantly aids in our analysis. Based on this, we derive the publisher’s revenue as
a function of his pricing strategy and show that only offering a subscription option
can never be optimal. We show that depending on the setting, either only offering
perpetual licences or offering a subscription option in addition to perpetual licenses can
be optimal, though for most software products, offering both options is likely to lead to
the best possible revenue. Through comparative statics we further evaluate the influence
different setting parameters have on the revenue of the various pricing strategies.
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2 Model
We model the problem as a two stage game. First, the publisher commits to a pricing
strategy. Then, over nmax timesteps users arrive to the system. Once a user has arrived
to the system, he faces a game with multiple timesteps. We can model this as an infinite
time horizon Markov Decision Process (MDP) where he can take actions and obtains
rewards depending on the state he is in.
2.1 Publisher Model
The publisher wants to sell a digital product. After m timesteps, he offers an optional
upgrade to the product.2 The product has a base quality q1, which the upgrade ad-
ditively increases by q2. While the base product is always available, the upgrade only
becomes available from timestep m onwards. Because of the digital nature of the good,
we assume that the publisher has infinite supply and no marginal costs. The publisher’s
strategy space consists of his choice of price vector p = (p<m1 , p
≥m
1 , p2, pS). Thus, he
offers a menu of options to his users: (1) buy the base product for a one-time payment
pn1 = p
<m
1 (if bought in timestep n < m) or (2) for p
n
1 = p
≥m
1 (if bought in timestep
n ≥ m), (3) buy the upgrade for a one-time payment p2 (only offered in timesteps
n ≥ m), or (4) subscribe for price pS per time step. A product that is bought can
be used forever, but the upgrade needs to be bought separately. On the other hand, a
subscription gives immediate access to all available upgrades, but the user loses access
to the product when his subscription lapses.
A publisher can choose to not offer a buy or subscribe option by setting the corre-
sponding price to infinity. The publisher’s utility is equal to his expected revenue per
user.
2.2 User model
Users are identified by their state and type. A user’s state is given by a tuple σ = (d, o).
While each user starts out interested in obtaining access to the product, after using
the product for some time this interest may vanish. The demand d ∈ {0, 1} denotes
whether the user is still interested in the product, i.e., whether he obtains any utility
for having access to it. The ownership vector o ∈ {0, 1}2 denotes whether a user owns
the base product, i.e., o1 = 1 or the upgrade, i.e., o2 = 1.
A user’s type is a tuple τ = (na, δ, γ, v). na ∈ {1, . . . , nmax} denotes the timestep
the user arrives into the system, i.e., the earliest time he could buy the product and
is drawn from a distribution with pmf fa. δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the user’s long term
engagement factor with the product and is drawn from a distribution with pmf fδ.
While any arriving user starts with demand d = 1 for the product, in any timestep in
which he uses the product he has a probability of 1 − δ to become uninterested and
lose demand (setting d = 0). A user who has lost demand no longer obtains utility
2 We limit ourselves in the analysis to exactly one upgrade after exactly m time steps to
simplify the exposition. Turning m into a strategic variable, as well as extending our model
to more than one upgrade or multiple price changes is straightforward.
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from having access to the product. The release of the upgrade has the complementary
probability δ to rekindle a lapsed user’s interest and set d = 1. γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the
quality decay factor of the user and is drawn from a distribution with pmf fγ . While
the product and the upgrade have qualities qi in the timesteps in which they become
available, the realized quality of the product for the users decreases every timestep as
hype and novelty fade and it slowly becomes outdated. The realized quality of having
access to o at time n is given by q(o, γ, n) =
∑
i∈o γ
n−miq. Lastly, v ∈ [0, vmax] denotes
the value a user has for a product of quality 1, as long as he has demand. v is drawn
from a distribution with pdf fv
A user’s action space in any timestep consists of whether he subscribes S ∈ {0, 1} or
buys the product or the upgrade b ∈ {0, 1}2. Subscription gives a user immediate access
to anything currently released, i.e., onS = [1, 0] if n < m and o
n
S = [1, 1] otherwise, while
buying b gives ownership of the bought product, i.e., changes the ownership vector from
o to o′ = max(o, b).
The normalized immediate reward wn of a user of type τ in timestep n and state
(d, o) is given by wn(S, b, τ, σ) = d ((1− S)q(max(o, b), γ, n) + Sq(onS , γ, n)), while his
immediate payment is given by ρn(S, b, τ, σ, p) = pSS + p
n
1 b1 + p2b2. His overall im-
mediate utility in timestep n is therefore given by un(S, b, τ, σ, p) = vwn(S, b, τ, σ) −
ρn(S, b, τ, σ, p).
A strategy α(n, σ) : N×{0, 1}× {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}× {0, 1}2 maps timesteps and user
states to actions. The normalized expected reward for playing strategy α is given by
w(α, τ) =
∞∑
n=na
∑
σ′
P (σn = σ
′|α, τ, σ)wn(S, b, τ, σ), (1)
where P (σn = σ
′|α, τ, σ) denotes the probability of the user being in state σ′ during
timestep n given α, τ, σ. Similarly, the expected payment is given by
ρ(α, τ, p) =
∞∑
n=na
∑
σ′
P (σn = σ
′|α, τ, σ)ρn(S, b, τ, σ, p). (2)
A user’s overall expected utility with strategy α is consequently given by
u(α, τ) = vw(α, τ)− ρ(α, τ, p). (3)
3 User Equilibrium Strategies
Before we can analyze the publisher’s revenue, we first need to determine how users
would react to any given publisher strategy. Since the supply of software is unlimited
and since we do not model any social effects, the utility of a given user is independent
of the strategies of the other users. We can therefore find the equilibrium strategy of
each user by solving his individual MDP in isolation.
For any given user type τ , we could directly do this through backward induction.
But doing so on a user’s full strategy space is computationally very costly, even for one
user. As we later need to compute the optimal strategies for each user type to calculate
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the publisher’s revenue, we now show that the optimal strategies for each user type can
only come from a small set of possible strategies. Note that throughout this section,
most expressions depend on the publisher strategy p. For the sake of readability, we
keep this dependency implicit and omit p wherever doing so does not cause confusion.
A first important observation for identifying potentially optimal user strategies is
that conceptually, the MDP for each user type can be seen to consist of two distinct
parts: anything that happens before the upgrade is released in timestep m and anything
that happens afterwards. For notational clarity and ease of exposition, we split user
strategies in this manner, i.e., setting α = (α1, α2), where α1 denotes a user’s strategy
before m and α2 denotes his strategy beginning from timestep m.
Before timestep m, a user’s actions are restricted to buying the base product, doing
nothing or subscribing. Note that subscribing in any timestep yields the same immediate
reward as owning the base product. Given this, we easily obtain the following result
that shows that there is only one potentially optimal strategy that involves buying
the product and one potentially optimal strategy that involves subscribing (though
possibly for zero timesteps). Overloading notation, we denote these by α1 = b and
α1 = s, respectively.
Lemma 1. 1. For a user of type τ = (na, δ, γ, v) that buys the base product before
timestep m, the optimal strategy α1 = b has him buy in the timestep na he arrives
and not subscribe in any timestep n < m.
2. For a user of type τ = (na, δ, γ, v) that does not buy the base product before timestep
m and plays some α2 from timestep m onwards, there exists n
α2,τ
1 such that the
optimal strategy α1 = s has him subscribe in any timestep n < n
α2,τ
1 where he has
demand and no other timesteps. It holds that nα2,τ1 is the smallest n ≥ 0 for which
it holds
v <
{
pS−(1−δ)2ρ((αs,α2),τ ′,p)
q([1,0],γ,n)−(1−δ)2w((αs,α2),τ ′) if n < m
∞ if n = m (4)
where τ ′ = (m, δ, γ, v) (i.e., ρ((αs, α2), τ ′, p) and w((αs, α2), τ ′) are the reward and
payment the user would obtain if he arrived in timestep m).
Proof. 1. The first statement follows directly by noting that when buying in a later
timestep before m, a user’s additional realized value compared to subscribing or
doing nothing decreased, but his payment did not decrease. He will therefore buy
in the first possible timestep and afterwards can not obtain any additional reward
through subscribing.
2. A subscribing user obtains immediate utility vq([1, 0], γ, n) − pS in any timestep
where he is subscribed, which decreases in n. Thus, if he does not subscribe in
any timestep nτ1 , then he will also not subscribe in any later timestep before m.
Additionally, in any timestep where he is subscribed, he has probability (1− δ) to
lose demand. If he loses demand before timestep m, then he still has probability δ
to regain demand in timestep m. This means that subscribing in timestep n < m
decreases the expected utility he obtains after timestep m by a factor of δ2. As he
does not buy before m, his utility from timestep m onward, if d = 1, is the same as
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if he had arrived in timestep m, i.e., as if his type was τ ′ = (m, δ, γ, v). The overall
change in expected utility for subscribing in the largest timestep n he subscribes is
thus given by
vq([1, 0], γ, n)− ps − v(1− t)2w((αs, α2), τ ′) + (1− t)2ρ((αs, α2), τ ′, p) (5)
and nτ1 is the first timestep for which this change would be negative.
Given Lemma 1 and a strategy α2 to play from timestep m onwards, there are only
two potentially optimal strategies before timestep m: buy in the timestep a user arrives,
denoted by α1 = b, or subscribe until timestep n
α2,τ
1 , denoted by α1 = s. To determine
which of these two strategies is optimal, we must next take the user’s strategy after the
upgrade release into account.
After the upgrade releases, the user’s space of potentially optimal strategies grows
slightly. In addition to buying the upgrade, and if not yet owned, the base product
(α2 = b) or not buying anything (α2 = s), a user might also decide to only buy the
base product, but not the upgrade (α2 = bb). This can for example happen if the base
product is heavily discounted after timestep m, but the price of the upgrade is set very
high. For such a user it might be optimal to first subscribe for a few timesteps, before
buying the base product.
Lemma 2. 1. For a user of type τ who buys the upgrade (and, if not yet owned, the
base product), the optimal strategy α2 = b is to buy as soon as possible (i.e., in
timestep max(na,m)) and to not subscribe in any timestep n ≥ m.
2. For a user of type τ with ownership vector o who does not buy anything after
timestep m, for the optimal strategy α2 = s there exists a timestep n
o,τ
2 ≥ m such
that he subscribes in any timestep n with m ≤ n < no,τ2 where he has demand d = 1
and subscribes in no timestep n ≥ no,τ2 . It holds that no,τ2 is the smallest n ≥ 0 for
which
v <
pS
q([1, 1]− o, γ, n) . (6)
3. For a user of type τ that only buys the base product after timestep m (and never
buys the upgrade), for the optimal strategy α2 = bb there exists a timestep n
τ
3 such
that he subscribes in and only in any timestep n with m ≤ n < nτ3 where he has
demand and buys in timestep nτ3 (if he still has demand). It holds that n
τ
3 is the
smallest n ≥ 0 for which
v <
pS − (1− δ)p≥m1
q([0, 1], γ, nτ3)
. (7)
Proof. 1. Follows analogously to the proof of the statement for buying before m in
Lemma 1.
2. Follows analogously to the proof of the statement for users who do not buy in
Lemma 1, though the users value for subscribing depends on whether they already
own the base product or not.
Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software 7
3. A user who does not buy the upgrade, but who does buy the base product after
timestep m, optimally does so in the first timestep where he does not subscribe.
Not doing so only decreases his reward but not his payment. When subscribing in
timestep n, such a user obtains an additional value of q([0, 1], γ, n)v over just owning
the base product and makes a payment of pS . He further has a probability of (1−δ)
to lose demand before the next timestep, in which case he does not buy at all, saving
(in expectation) (1− δ)p≥m1 . This means that a user’s utility for subscribing in the
highest timestep in which he subscribes is given by q([0, 1], γ, n)v−pS +(1−δ)p≥m1 .
As this utility decreases in n, the user either does not subscribe at all (i.e. buys in
timestep m or when he arrives) or there exists a smallest timestep nγ,v3 for which his
added utility for subscribing becomes negative and in which he buys. Note that here
the user wants to buy by assumption, even though doing so might not be optimal
anymore in timestep nγ,v3 . If that is the case, then not buying the base product and
subscribing until n
[0,0],τ
2 (i.e., playing α2 = s) would be better.
Given Lemma 2, there are only three potentially optimal strategies beginning in
timestep m: (1) buy the upgrade (and, if not owned yet, the base product) once the
upgrade releases in m (or once the user arrives if na > m), (2) not buy anything and
subscribe until timestep no,τ2 , or (3) subscribe before timestep n
τ
3 , then buy the base
product in time step nτ3 . We denote these by α2 = b, α2 = s and α2 = bb respectively.
Taken together, Lemmas 1 and 2 describe all potentially optimal strategies for any
user.
Proposition 1. It maximizes the expected utility of a user of type τ to play strategy
α∗τ,p = argmaxα1∈{b,s},α2∈{b,s,bb}vw((α1, α2), τ)− ρ((α1, α2), τ, p) (8)
Proof. Follows directly from combining Lemmas 1 and 2.
Results on how to calculate the reward and payments for each strategy in an efficient
way can be found in Appendix A.
4 Publisher Revenue
Given the results for the optimal user strategies from Section 3, we can now give a
relatively simple expression for the publisher’s revenue.
Proposition 2. Given strategy p = (p<m1 , p
≥m
1 , p2, pS), the publisher’s expected rev-
enue per user is given by
pi(p) =
∑
na
∑
δ
∑
γ
∫
v
ρ
(
α∗(na,δ,γ,v),p, (na, δ, γ, v), p
)
fa(na)fδ(δ)fγ(γ)fv(v)dv (9)
where α∗(na,δ,γ,v),p is given by Proposition 1
Proof. Follows directly by taking the optimal user strategies α∗(na,δ,γ,v),p for each type
τ as given by Proposition 1 and taking the expectation over all types.
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While this expression for the publisher’s revenue can easily be evaluated for a given
p (employing the results in Appendix A) it is highly non-convex in p and has many
local maxima: Changing prices affects different users differently and usually increase
the payments of some users but reduces the payment of other users. Consequently,
first-order derivative tests are very bad indicators for whether a given price vector p is
close to optimal.
Similarly, whether only offering an (optimal) buy or subscription option would lead
to better revenue for the publisher depends on the complex interaction of all parameters
of the setting. We can find settings where either strategy yields higher revenue for the
publisher and there does not seem to exist a simple condition for deciding which is
optimal without solving for the optimal price p. But what we can say is that, while only
offering a buy option is optimal in at least some settings, only offering a subscription
option can never be as good as offering both options to users.
Proposition 3. While only offering a buy option can be revenue optimal in some set-
tings, only offering a subscription option is never revenue optimal.
Proof. To see that only offering a buy option can be optimal, consider a setting without
a later upgrade (i.e., m = 1) and only a single user type τ . Since the expected reward
for owning is higher than the expected reward for subscribing up to any finite timestep,
users are willing to pay more for perpetual licenses than for subscribing. Since there
is only one user type and by Lemma 2 buying users buy in the timestep they arrive,
adding an additional subscription option can not extract additional revenue.
To see that only offering a subscription option can never be optimal, assume some
p with pS < ∞ and p<m1 = p≥m1 = p2 = ∞ is optimal. Given p, let τmax be the set
consisting of the user types that make the highest expected payment after timestep m.
Denote this payment by ρ>mmax. Since the reward for buying in timestep m is always
strictly higher than the reward for subscribing from m to any finite timestep, users of
type τmax would be willing to pay ρ
>m
max +  for owning the product from timestep m
onwards. Setting p≥m1 = ρ
>m
max + , p2 = 0 for  > 0 small enough therefore leads to
users in a neighborhood around τmax buying in timestep m and paying strictly more
than ρ>mmax, while no user pays less. Consequently, p = (ρ
>m
max + ,∞, 0, pS) yields higher
revenue for the publisher and only offering subscriptions cannot be revenue optimal.
5 Numerical Evaluation
To better understand when offering subscriptions can increase a publisher’s revenue
and by how much it typically does so, we now present a number of numerical examples
and comparative statics. For each example, we give the optimal revenue for the optimal
prices for a publisher who either (1) only offers a buy option (Opt(Buy)), (2) only offers
a subscription option (Opt(Sub)), (3) offers both options (Opt(Both)), or (4) offers both
options, but restricts the buy prices of perpetual licenses to those that would be optimal
without subscription option (Opt(Both | Opt(Buy))).
Since the publisher’s revenue as a function of his price vector has many local max-
ima, all optimal publisher strategies in the following are calculated using a best-of-15
differential evolution search [12]. As this is a stochastic search, full optimality for all
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data points cannot be guaranteed. Those imprecisions can be seen as small local fluc-
tuations of the function values in our plots.
5.1 Experimental Setup: Video Games
For our numerical analysis to have merit, we need to choose realistic settings parameters.
We chose the domain of video games for our numerics, because some user data as well
as pricing data is available for this domain, which we can use to inform our choice of
parameters and distributions.3 In this section, we describe some basic insights we have
obtained from the available data and how they have influenced our choice of parameters.
We bought a dataset from the website Steam Spy 4, which collects publicly available
data from the large video game storefront Steam5 and uses it to statistically estimate the
number of owners of video games over time and what percentage of them actively used
the game recently (i.e., in the last two weeks). While this data is prone to estimation
errors and only contains limited information about those users that bought the games,
it still allows us to make a number of general observations to help find reasonable
distributions. In the following, we describe the general insights we have obtained from
analyzing this data.6 We provide plots for some representative games in Appendix B.
1. For most games, while the game is supported, its monthly sales stay roughly con-
stant as long as the price of the game keeps decreasing and afterwards drops off
relatively slowly. This suggests that the arrival rate of new users is roughly con-
stant, though the quality decays, which in turn is counteracted by price drops. The
exception to this is the release month (+/- 1-2 weeks), which for big releases can
have 3−10 times as many sales, as many users effectively arrived before the game’s
release but could not buy it yet. Additionally, the release of bigger upgrades often
boosts sales of the base game, which can be explained by users in the system holding
off their purchase until the upgrade releases. Denoting the overall arrivals during
the first timestep by xa, we set the arrival distribution fa to be
fa(na) =
{
xa
xa+nmax−1 if na = 1
1
xa+nmax−1 if 1 < na < nmax
(10)
While we will later vary xa, we choose xa = 5 as the standard value for most of the
section.
2. While games on Steam usually do not change their base price, most games get
regularly (i.e., typically every few weeks) discounted for a limited period of time,
and most users buy during those discount periods. Taking this into account, the
3 To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive study of how users in this domain are
typically distributed is available, which is why we have to base our parameter choices on a
rough analysis of some limited datasets that we have access to.
4 https://steamspy.com/about
5 https://store.steampowered.com/about/
6 The purpose of this exercise was to find reasonable parameter settings and distributions for
the comparative statics. A detailed empirical analysis (e.g., fitting a statistical model to the
data) is beyond the scope of this paper.
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p<m1 p
≥m
1 p2 pS Revenue User Welfare Overall Welfare
Opt(Buy) 45.82 21.8 18.06 ∞ 31.42 33.23 64.65
Opt(Sub) ∞ ∞ ∞ 14.66 33.54 24.07 57.61
Opt(Both) 96.98 35.19 47.96 17.71 37.88 24.39 62.27
Opt(Both | Opt(Buy)) 45.82 21.8 18.06 18.4 31.82 33.89 65.71
Table 1. Results for four different publisher strategies for the base case
price of most games effectively drops by 40% − 60% during the first year. As the
number of new owners per timestep stays roughly constant and assuming the arrival
rate of users is constant, this suggests that the quality of most games for users that
do buy on average decays at a rate around 10% per month, i.e., γ = 0.9. As not
much more distributional information is available, for simplicity we assume for our
numerics that γ ∈ {0.85, 0.9, 0.95}. We let xγ denote the probability that γ is 0.9
and set the γ distribution fγ to be fγ(0.9) = xγ and fγ(0.85) = fγ(0.95) =
1
2 (1−xγ).
While we will later vary xγ , we choose xγ = 0.8 as the standard value for most of
the section.
3. While Steam Spy does not contain data on whether a user played a game after a
certain date, it does contain data for the percentage of users who own the game
and have played it in the last two week. Using this as a proxy for the percentage
of users with demand d = 1, we see that the percentage of users who stop playing
after a month for most games varies between 40% and 80% percent. For most
games, once the percentage of active users has reached about 20%, it starts to only
fall very slowly. Accounting for the fact that there are constantly new users buying
the game, it is reasonable to assume that 20% of users have a 90% probability to
not lose demand in each timestep, i.e., δ = 0.9. We therefore settle on a simple
two-type distribution of long-term and short-term users. Denoting the probability
that a short-term user does not lose demand after one timestep by xδ, we obtain
fδ(xδ) = 0.8 and fδ(0.9) = 0.2. While we will later vary xδ, we choose xδ = 0.5 as
the standard value used for most of the section.
4. The dataset does not contain much information that would allow us to estimate the
distribution of user values. We therefore simply set the user values to be distributed
according to a normal distribution with mean µ = 25 truncated to [0, 50]. While
we will later vary the standard deviation σ of fv, we choose σ = 10 as the standard
value for most of the section.
Additionally, for the numerical analysis, we set q1 = 1, q2 = 0.5, m = 6 and nmax = 12.
5.2 Base case
In this section, we discuss the numerical results for the base case with xa = 5, xγ =
0.8, xδ = 0.5 and σ = 10. This parametrization roughly corresponds to a typical game
based on our analysis of the Steam Spy data. The results for each type of publisher
strategy are summarized in Table 1.
The best attainable revenue for a publisher who only wants to sell perpetual licenses
without offering a subscription option (i.e., Opt(Buy)) is pi(p) = 31.42. As this revenue
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is attained with a relatively low price (that is further discounted roughly 50% once the
upgrade releases), the publisher ensures that most users buy his product. This leaves
the users with relatively high utility for owning the game and thus the users’ social
welfare (i.e., the expected utility of a randomly drawn user) is relatively high at 33.23.
If the publisher would instead only offer a subscription option (i.e., Opt(Sub)), his
expected revenue per user increases to pi = 33.54, a substantial 6.7% increase over only
offering the buy option. This is possible because, when only offering a buy option the
publisher had to set a relatively low price to attract users that are only interested in
playing the game for a short time as well as users that want to play it for a long time.
The subscription option on the other hand automatically price discriminates between
those user types and extracts more revenue from long-term users. Consequently, this
revenue increase comes at the cost of the user welfare, which decreases substantially.
Unfortunately, this is not simply a transfer of utility from the users to the publisher,
as the users welfare decreases more than the publisher’s revenue increases. This loss
is caused because users whose perceived quality of the game decayed too much stop
subscribing, even though they would like to continue playing. They are simply not
willing to pay the subscription price anymore. This decreases the system’s overall welfare
(i.e., the sum of revenue and user welfare) by 11%.
If the publisher decides to offer both perpetual and subscription licenses (i.e.,
Opt(Both)), then he can further increase his revenue to pi = 37.87, an additional 12.9%
increase over only offering a subscription option and a staggering 20.5% increase over
only selling perpetual licenses. This revenue increase requires that all prices rise com-
pared to when only one of the two alternative license types are offered. While the
subscription price only moderately increases to pS = 17.71, the buy prices roughly
double to p<m1 = 98.98, p
≥m
1 = 35.19, p2 = 47.96. Interestingly, with these prices, any
user that subscribes for 3 or less timesteps before the price change and then buys the
discounted base product still pays less overall than if he would have bought the base
product directly. Consequently, we see that 52.9% of users that arrive in timestep 1 only
subscribe at first, but ultimately buy a perpetual licenses once it is discounted (as long
as they still have demand). Only 15.3% of users that arrive in timestep 1 are willing
to directly buy the game at its high starting price. This truly splits the user base into
two parts. First there are casual users that subscribe for a few timesteps and often pay
even less than they would with the buy option. Then there are power users that plan
to use the game for a long time, often longer than they would be willing to subscribe,
and are thus willing to pay the increased buy price. Consequently, despite the notable
revenue increase, user welfare does not decrease further and, compared to only offering
a subscription option, even slightly increases to 24.4. While this is still notably lower
than the user welfare when only offering perpetual licenses, the system’s overall welfare
(i.e., the sum of revenue and user welfare) now is only about 3.7% lower, showing that
most of the user welfare gets transferred to the publisher instead of being lost.
Lastly, we analyze whether the publisher can increase his profit by offering a sub-
scription option without changing the buy prices of perpetual licenses (i.e., Opt(Both|
Opt(Buy))). This would guarantee that no user is worse off than when only perpet-
ual licenses are offered, which is an important consideration when there are competing
products. Any revenue increase under such a pricing model has to come from additional
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users that do not buy perpetual licenses even when no subscription option is offered.
If the publisher fixes his buy prices at p<m1 = 45.82, p
≥m
1 = 21.8, p2 = 18.06, the op-
timal subscription price is pS = 18.4. Considering that the publisher wants to attract
additional users, it might seem counterintuitive that pS here is even higher than the
subscription price that was optimal combined with the far higher optimal buy price.
This effect occurs because the lower the buy price, the more users with low long-term
engagement are willing to buy when no subscription option is offered. But those same
users readily switch to subscribing and pay even less when pS is low, increasing market
cannibalization. Consequently, the attainable revenue increase is comparatively mod-
est, with the publisher obtaining at most pi = 31.82, an increase of 1.3%. While this
pales compared to the potential revenue increase with fully optimized prices, it can still
constitute an additional revenue of hundredth of thousands or even millions of dollars
for large releases. Importantly, since this pricing strategy, by construction, leads to a
Pareto improvement for the users, user welfare also slightly increases.
5.3 Comparative Statics
We now study how varying the setting parameters xδ, xγ , σ, xa affects the publisher’s
revenue under his four different strategies. In Figures 1 to 4, we present comparative
statics for how the optimal revenue of each type of publisher strategy changes in relation
to the revenue of only offering a buy option (which we normalize to 1).
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Fig. 1. Revenue for different long-term
engagement distributions (i.e., varying xδ)
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Fig. 2. Revenue for different quality decay dis-
tributions (i.e., varying xγ)
In Figure 1, we see that the subscription option is best when the spread between
short-term and long-term users is largest (i.e., xδ is small), as subscription inherently
differentiates users on how long they are interested in the product. For very high xδ,
i.e., when every user in expectation has demand for many timesteps, the potential rev-
enue gain of offering a subscription alongside a buy option becomes very small (on the
magnitude of 0.5%). This is because at that point, too many users stop subscribing de-
spite still having demand because their perceived value decayed below the subscription
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price. This makes subscription options inherently unattractive and any subscription
price that could attract a large amount of additional users would cause too much mar-
ket cannibalization. Interestingly, for low xδ (< 0.36 when only offering a buy option
and < 0.46 when offering both options), it is optimal to give out the upgrade for free
(but make the base product more expensive). This is whats causes the sudden drop in
attainable revenue increase for adding a subscription option without changing the buy
price, as users with relatively high quality decay that were priced out of buying before
that point (and thus were willing to get a relatively expensive subscription for 1 or 2
time steps) afterwards switch to only buying the base game.
In Figure 2, we see that while increasing xγ , and therefore decreasing the population
variance of the quality decay factor γ, decreases the relative revenue potential of just
offering a subscription, it can still increase the revenue potential of offering both options
as market cannibalization decreases.
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Fig. 3. Revenue for different value
distributions (i.e., varying σ)
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Fig. 4. Revenue for different arrival
distributions (i.e., varying xa)
In Figure 3, we see that the variance of the user values for the most part has a
relatively low impact on the relative revenue potential of the different strategies. But
since the optimal price when only offering a buy option for with the given parameters
is low enough that users with average valuation buy even if the have a low long-term
engagement factor δ and decay factor γ, the potential revenue advantage of offering a
subscription option without changing buy prices goes to zero with low σ.
In Figure 4, we see that how many users arrive in timestep 1 also has a relatively low
impact on the relative revenue potential of the different strategies. Similar to low σ, we
again see that for very low xa, the potential revenue improvement of offering a subscrip-
tion option without changing the buy price goes to zero. Here this is caused by the fact
that the buy price keeps decreasing because late arriving users become relatively more
important for the publisher’s revenue, making it harder and harder to offer a reasonably
prices subscription option without loosing revenue to market cannibalization.
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5.4 Correlating value and long term demand
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Fig. 5. Revenue for different levels of
correlation (i.e., varying xc)
So far all type variables were assumed to be independent from each other. In practice
it is likely that some (but not all) users with high long term engagement factor δ have
lower values v, for example because they do not have much leisure time to use the game
in each timestep and therefore need to own it for longer to spend the same time using
it. In this example we want to study how introducing some correlation between δ and
v changes the publisher’s revenue. To that end, we let the value distribution depend on
δ. For a dependence factor of xc set the value distribution for a users with long-term
engagement factor δ to a normal distribution with mean µ = 25((1 − xc) + xc(1 − δ))
and standard deviation σ = 10, again truncated to [0, 50]. As we can see in Figure 5,
while increasing the dependence between value and long-term engagement decreases
the revenue potential of a subscription option, offering both options is still markedly
better even when the mean of the normal distribution underlying a users value is fully
dependent on the user’s long-term engagement factor (i.e., xc = 1). Interestingly, this
dependence does not seem to have much, if any, effect on the revenue potential of
introducing a subscription option without changing the buy prices.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the revenue maximization problem of a publisher wanting to either
sell perpetual or subscription licenses for consumer software. In conclusion, combining
subscription and perpetual license is typically revenue optimal when selling consumer
software, realistically increasing revenue by 10% − 20% over only offering perpetual
license. Offering both types of licenses, it is often further possible to combine a revenue
increase compared to only offering perpetual licenses with a Pareto improvement for the
users, though the resulting revenue increase is then only on the magnitude of 1%− 2%.
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A Reward and payment with the potentially optimal strategies
In this section we derive expressions for the expected reward and payment for any of the
potentially optimal strategies that can be evaluated relatively cheaply. Towards this,
we first derive the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3. Assume a user of type τ with arrival time na < m that either, beginning
in timestep n′ = na, subscribes in any timestep before n′′ ≤ m and takes no other
action or buys the product in timestep n′ = na (in which case n′′ = m). The expected
normalized reward such a user obtains before timestep m is given by
w<m(n′, n′′, o1) = q1(γn
′ 1− (ltγ)max(0,n′′−n′)
1− ltγ + γ
n′′o1
1− (ltγ)m−n′′)
1− ltγ ) (11)
The probability that such a user has demand d = 1 in timestep m is given by
κ(n′, n′′, o) = δn
′′−n′ + δ(1− δn′′−n′) (12)
Similarly, assume a user of type τ with value v = 1 and ownership vector o that has
demand in timestep n′ = max(na,m) and subscribes from n′ in any timestep before
n′′ ≥ m and takes no other action. The expected value such a user obtains after timestep
m is given by
w≥m(n′, n′′, o) =(γn
′
q1 + γ
n′−mq2)
1− (ltγ)max(0,n′′−n′)
1− ltγ (13)
+ (γn
′′
q1o1 + γ
n′′−mq2o2)
1
1− ltγ (14)
A user of type τ that has demand d = 1 in timestep n′ and subscribes from n′ in
any timestep before n′′ ≥ m where he still has demand and takes no other action makes
an expected payment of
ρ(n′, n′′) =pS
1− (lt)n′′−n′
1− lt (15)
Proof. Recall that the normalized reward of a user of type τ that follows some strategy
α is given by
w(α, τ) =
∞∑
n=na
∑
σ′
P (σn = σ
′|α, τ)wn(S, b, τ, σ′). (16)
For a user with ownership vector o that subscribes from n′ = na to n′′−1 and takes
no other action (i.e., o never changes), the expected normalized reward before timestep
m is consequently given by
w<m(n′, n′′, o1) =
m−1∑
n=na
∑
σ′
P (σn = σ
′|(n′, n′′), τ)wn(S, b, τ, σ′) (17)
=
m−1∑
n=na
P (dn = 1|α, τ)wn(S, b, τ, (1, o)). (18)
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For any timestep n in which the user subscribes, the probability to loose demand is
1− δ and it follows
n′′−1∑
n=na
P (dn = 1|α, τ)wn(S, b, τ, (1, o)) =
n′′−1∑
n=na
δn−nawn(S, b, τ, (1, o)) (19)
=
n′′−1∑
n=na
δn−naγnq1 (20)
=
n′′∑
n=na
(γδ)n−naγnaq1 (21)
= γnaq1
1− (γδ)n′′−na
1− γδ . (22)
Here, the last equality follows as a partial geometric series. Analogously, taking into
account that for o1 = 0 no more value is obtained, for the remaining timesteps it holds
m−1∑
n=n′′
P (dn = 1|α, τ)wn(S, b, τ, (1, o)) = γn′′o1q1 1− (γδ)
m−n′′
1− γδ . (23)
and the statement for w<m(n′, n′′, o1) follows.
The probability that such a user still has demand in timestep n′′ is given by δn
′′−n′ .
If he does, then he also still has demand in timestep m. If he on the other hand does
not have demand anymore in timestep n′′, then he still has a probability of δ to regain
demand with the upgrade release and price change in timestep m. The statement for
w≥m(n′, n′′, o) follows analogously to the statement for w<m(n′, n′′, o1).
For all potentially optimal α, we can now easily derive a user’s reward and payment.
Proposition 4. For strategy α = (α1, α2) with α1 ∈ {b, s}, α2 ∈ {b, s, bb}, the normal-
ized expected reward for playing α is
w((b, b), τ) =
{
ψ1(na, na, 1) + κ(na, na, 1)ψ2(m,m, [1, 1]) if na < m
ψ2(na, na, [1, 1]) if na ≥ m
(24)
w((b, s), τ) =
{
ψ1(na, na, 1) + κ(na, na, 1)ψ2(m,n
1,τ
2 , [1, 0]) if na < m
ψ2(na, n
1,τ
2 , [1, 0]) if na ≥ m
(25)
w((s, s), τ) =
{
ψ1(na, n1, 0) + κ(na, n
τ
1 , 0)ψ2(m,n
0,τ
2 , [0, 0]) if na < m
ψ2(na, n
0,τ
2 , [0, 0]) if na ≥ m
(26)
w((s, b), τ) =
{
ψ1(na, n
τ
1 , 0) + κ(na, n
τ
1 , 0)ψ2(m,m, [1, 1]) if na < m
ψ2(na, na, [1, 1]) if na ≥ m
(27)
w((s, bb)) =
{
ψ1(na, n
τ
1 , 0) + κ(na, n
τ
1 , 0)ψ2(m,n
τ
3 , [1, 0]) if na < m
ψ2(m,n
τ
3 , [1, 0]) if na ≥ m
(28)
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The expected payments are
ρ((b, b), τ) =
{
p<m1 + κ(na, na, 1)p2 if na < m
p≥m1 + p2 if na ≥ m
(29)
ρ((b, s), τ) =
{
p<m1 + κ(na, na, 1)ρS(nm, n
1,τ
2 ) if na < m
p≥m1 + ρS(na, n
1
2) if na ≥ m
(30)
ρ((s, s), τ) =
{
ρS(na, n
τ
1) + κ(na, n
τ
1 , 0)ρS(m,n
0,τ
2 ) if na < m
ρS(na, n
0
2) if na ≥ m
(31)
ρ((s, b), τ) =
{
ρS(na, n
τ
1) + κ(na, n
τ
1 , 0)(p
≥m
1 + p2) if na < m
p≥m1 + p2 if na ≥ m
(32)
ρ((b, bb), τ) =
{
ρS(na, n
τ
1) + κ(na, n
τ
1 , 0)
(
ρS(m,n
τ
3) + δ
nτ3−mp≥m1
)
if na < m
ρS(na, n
τ
3) + δ
nτ3−nap≥m1 if na ≥ m
(33)
Proof. The statement follows by combining the actions taken under each strategy as
described in Lemmas 1 and 2 with Lemma 3 by noting that the player always either
subscribes, owns all the available products he plans to buy with his strategy or does
not have demand.
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B Owners, Prices and Activity Data Examples
B.1 Stellaris, a 4X grand strategy strategy game
This is a so called 4X (Explore, Expand, Exploit, Exterminate) grand strategy game
with regular small updates (which we do not model) and optional paid upgrades. During
the observed timeframe, 4 large paid upgrades released, in October of 2016, April and
September of 2017 , as well as frebruary of 2018. Each coincides with an up-tick in
active players, though only the April upgrade seems to have lead to a large rise in sales.
This most likely happened because it brought the quality of the whole product above
a level where users that had held up on buying finally bought the base product.
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B.2 Dark Souls III, an action RPG
This is a large, story driven game with a minor multi-player component. Famous for
being very challenging. There were two paid upgrades released, one in October 2017
and one in March of 2017 that are both visible as up ticks in active players.
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B.3 Slay the Spire, a rogue-like card deck building game
This is a relatively small game that user typically play with low intensity, but for a long
period of time. Additionally, in difference to the other two games, Slay the Spire had
an so called ’early access’ period during which an unfinished version was sold at a lower
price while obtaining regular free updates. In our model, this in roughly comparable to
increasing (instead of decreasing) the base products price when the upgrade releases,
but giving out the upgrade for free.
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